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NOTES
A Tippee's Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10B-5:
Dirks v. S.E.C.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has attempted to restrict ap-
plication of Section 10(b)1 of the Security Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule lOb-5 2 with regard to tipper3 and tippee4 liability for trad-
ing on material, nonpublic corporate information. Most recently, in
Dirks v. S.E.C.,5 the Court preserved this pattern when it delineated
1. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act have become
the primary tools in preventing fraud in insider trading. The pertinent part of § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. § 780) (1976), reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange: ...b) To use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national se-
curities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
2. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly, or indirectly by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 have become the kernels of all antifraud actions brought
either privately or by the SEC. Glickman, "Tippee" Liability Under Section 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 20 KAN. L. REV. 47 n.4 (1971).
They are broad remedial provisions which are designed "to protect the investing public
and to secure fair dealing in the securities markets by promoting full disclosure of inside
information so that an informed judgment can be made by all investors who trade in
such markets." Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
235 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
3. Tippers are persons who possess material inside information and also selec-
tively disclose it. Tarasi v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1154 n.1 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977). Courts regularly substitute the term insider for
tipper. Insiders have knowledge of facts not available to the general public. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a). Upon conveying it to a tippee, the insider becomes a tipper. For simplicity,
this Note will use the term insider as it is more inclusive.
4. A tippee can be characterized as a person who receives material inside informa-
tion from a corporate insider or from another tippee. 5A A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF
RULE 10B-5 § 66.02 (rev. ed. 1980).
5. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
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a new, restricted standard for tippee liability. The Court held that a
tippee becomes obligated by a duty to publicly disclose the inside
information, 6 only when two events have occurred. First, the in-
sider who disclosed the information to the tippee, must have
breached a pre-existing fiduciary duty owed to the corporation.
This duty is not breached unless the insider derived a personal bene-
fit from his disclosure. Second, the tippee must have known or have
had constructive knowledge of the insider's breach.7 This Note will
retrace the history of the cases which collectively created the stan-
dard for tippee liability prior to Dirks. It will then analyze the re-
sulting standards under Dirks and identify two issues left
unresolved by the Supreme Court. Finally, an alternative solution
to the Dirks holding will be presented.
I. HISTORY OF TIPPEE LIABILITY UNDER RULE 1OB-5
A. In Re Cady, Roberts & Company
One of the primary contributions to the expansion of Rule lOb-5
liability to persons traditionally not considered insiders was Cady,
Roberts & Co..8 The SEC 9 in Cady held that insiders have an af-
firmative duty to disclose material facts prior to trading, which are
known to them by virtue of their position, but which are unknown
to persons with whom they deal. In the alternative, the Commis-
sion asserted that the insider may simply refrain from trading. 10
The Commission found, however, that this duty to "disclose or re-
frain" was not limited to traditional insiders.1 1 Since the duty is a
result of the unfairness which exists when one trader has informa-
tion obtained through his relationship with the corporation, which
he uses to his advantage, the duty to disclose or refrain will be im-
posed on all persons who are in a special relationship with the
6. Inside or insider information is a common term used for nonpublic corporate
information.
7. 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
8. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
9. SEC refers to the Securities Exchange Commission.
10. 40 S.E.C. at 911.
11. Id. Although the court used the term "insider" in its formulation of a rule, it
asserted that corporate insiders, (e.g., officers, directors, and controlling stockholders)
did not exhaust the class of persons upon whom the duty was placed. "Analytically, the
obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corpo-
rate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfair-
ness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." Id. at 912. Under the pre-Chiarella case
law, anyone having access to material inside information assumed the status of an in-
sider and the accompanying duty of disclosure. Glickman, "Tippee" Liability Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 20 KAN. L. REV.
47, 48 (1971).
[Vol. 21
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corporation. 12
In Cady, the SEC imposed this duty on Robert Gintel, a partner
of a registered broker-dealer, for trading on information received
from his partner, J. Cheever Cowdin, a director of the Curtis-
Wright Corporation. 13 The SEC found that since Gintel's partner,
Cowdin, was a director of Curtis-Wright, his relationship with the
company clearly prevented him from trading on the undisclosed in-
formation. 14 Gintel, in contrast, had no independent relationship
with Curtis-Wright; however, his association with Cowdin as a
partner provided him with access to the company's internal affairs.
As a consequence, the Commission held that Cowdin's relationship
with Curtis-Wright also prohibited Gintel from trading on the com-
pany's nonpublic information. 15 Although Gintel was labeled
neither an insider nor a tippee, the Commission found that he had
acquired an insider's duty to disclose or refrain. Since he failed to
disclose the information regarding the Curtis-Wright dividend re-
duction before trading, he violated Rule lOb-5. 16
Cady has become famous essentially for having laid down the dis-
close or refrain duty mentioned above. However, the application of
a duty to fraudulent trading by non-insiders, such as tippees, was
still uncertain after Cady since the Commission failed to identify the
precise status of Gintel. 17 Although the issue of tippee liability was
not before it, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas Gulf
Sulphur,'8 nevertheless took the opportunity to voice its opinion as
to the applicability of the Cady duty to tippees. The Court noted
12. The relationship which the Commission asserts gives rise to a duty is "a special
relationship with a company" in which the insider is "privy to its internal affairs,"
Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912. This element was essentially ignored by subsequent courts until
the United States Supreme Court firmly implanted it in its standard in Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See infra notes 44-75 and accompanying text.
13. Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912. The "tip" consisted of information that the directors of
Curtis-Wright were about to publicly announce their decision to reduce the company's
quarterly dividend. Upon being informed of the dividend reduction, Gintel, the broker,
sold on behalf of his clients, 2,000 shares of Curtis-Wright stock and sold short an
additional 5,000 shares. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Commission only noted that the facts of the case "imposed on Gintel
the responsibilities of those commonly refered to as 'insiders.'" Id.
18. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Texas Gulf,
several officers and directors of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation purchased options
and calls on the Corporation's stock after the company had discovered a sizeable copper
and zinc ore formation. In addition, a Texas Gulf geologist tipped outside individuals,
telling the tippees that the company's stock "was a good buy." The court found that
over 8,000 shares of Texas Gulf common stock and 4,700 call options were placed by
Texas Gulf insiders. The tippees traded stock and call options totaling 10,500 shares.
Id. at 847-52. In this proceeding, only the insiders were sued, thus, the issue of tippee
liability was addressed only in the court's dictum. Id. at 848.
1984]
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that if tippees have actual or constructive knowledge that material
information they possess is undisclosed, their conduct can be
equally violative of Rule lOb-5 as is the conduct of insiders who
trade. Thus, Texas Gulf Sulphur recognized that the courts should
be willing to find 1Ob-5 liability for both insiders and tippees who
trade on material, nonpublic information. Since the question of tip-
pee liability was addressed only within the court's dicta, there re-
mained a question of precisely when the duty to disclose or refrain
arose in regard to tippee trading. Subsequent proceedings against
the brokerage firm of Merrill Lynch provided an answer to this
question.
B. The Merrill Lynch Cases: Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. and In Re Investors Management
Company
Shapiro19 and its predecessor Investors Management,20 exemplify
the courts' determination to extend Rule lOb-5 liability for fraudu-
lent trading on nonpublic information to tippees of corporate insid-
ers. Where both Cady and Texas Gulf Sulphur alluded to tippee
liability under Rule lOb-5, Investors Management went further by
firmly delineating the circumstances which give rise to a tippee's
duty to disclose or refrain. The Commission held that a duty will
be imposed on a tippee when the following elements exist: (a) pos-
session of information by the tippee which is material and nonpub-
liC;21 (b) the tippee knew or had reason to know that the
information was "nonpublic and had been obtained improperly by
selective revelation or otherwise"; 22 and (c) "that the information
19. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974). Shapiro was a private civil suit by former shareholders of Douglas Aircraft Co.
against Merrill Lynch and certain of its officers, directors and employees. The plaintiffs
sought damages and an accounting of profits realized by the defendants.
20. In Re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). Investors Man-
agement was an action commenced by the SEC against several clients of Merrill Lynch
who were tipped by Merrill Lynch employees. The SEC sought to censure each of the
defendants. Both Shapiro and Investors Management derive from the same transactions.
21. Material information has been described as information of such importance
that there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to act. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976). See also Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 650 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1981);
Vaugh v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980); S.E.C. v. Blatt 583 F.2d 1325
(5th Cir. 1978); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937
(1968). Factors to be considered in order to determine whether the information is mate-
rial are: a) the degree of specificity of the information; b) the extent to which it differs
from information previously disseminated to the public; c) its reliability in light of its
nature and source and the circumstances under which it was received. Investors Man-
agement, 44 S.E.C. at 642.
22. Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 641.
(Vol. 21
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be a factor in his decision to effect the transaction. ' 23 Three years
later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Shapiro pronounced
that tippees who have possession of material, nonpublic information
which they know or should know came from a corporate insider,
become obligated under the disclose or refrain duty.24
In the above cases, Merrill Lynch was acting as a lead under-
writer for a proposed offering of convertible debentures of Douglas
Aircraft Company. In order to prepare Douglas' registration state-
ments, Merrill Lynch was given Douglas projections of the com-
pany's reduced earnings for the first six months of 1966. This
information was disclosed to several investment companies which
eventually traded Douglas stock.25
The Securities and Exchange Commission in Investors Manage-
ment applied its three-part test to determine if Merrill Lynch's cli-
ents, the tippee investment companies, had acquired a duty to
disclose or refrain. The Commission held that the tippees acquired
the Cady duty to refrain or disclose since they had possession of
nonpublic information which they knew had been selectively and
improperly revealed to them by Merrill Lynch and which was used
in trading their Douglas holdings.2 6 Thus, by trading Douglas
stock, the tippees breached this duty.27
The Commission explicitly rejected an assertion by the defend-
ants that a tippee cannot be obligated by a duty to disclose or re-
frain unless it was shown that either, 1) the recipient had some type
of special relationship with the issuer or corporate insider giving
him access to nonpublic information, or that in the absence of such
a showing; 2) that he had actual knowledge that the insider
breached his fiduciary duty.28 The Commission asserted that a tip-
pee becomes obligated with the duty to disclose or refrain when he
has possession of information which, by its nature, places the tippee
in a position superior to other investors. Actual tippee knowledge
of a fiduciary breach by the tipping insider is unnecessary. Rather,
23. Id.
24. -Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 238.
25. Id. at 231-34. Originally given to a Merrill Lynch vice president, the informa-
tion was relayed by him to the company's senior aerospace analyst who in turn relayed
it to two salesmen in the Merrill Lynch New York institutional sales office. Ultimately,
the information was disclosed to several investment companies by Merrill Lynch em-
ployees in the New York sales office. Upon receiving this information, the tippees pro-
ceeded to sell from a long and short position, over 154,000 Douglas shares valued at
$13,300,000.
The stock in question was sold between June 21 and June 23 of 1966. On June 21,
Douglas stock sold for 90 1/2, it declined to a low of 30 in October of 1966. Investors
Management, 44 S.E.C. at 636.
26. Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 642-47.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 643-44.
1984]
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the duty arises when the tippee has reason to know that his tip ema-
nates from a corporate source.29 This standard reflects a decision
by the Commission to obligate a tippee to disclose or refrain when
he has mere possession of material, nonpublic information. Thus,
the focus was on policing the possession of information which cre-
ates an unfair advantage in the securities market.30
Applying its new standard, the Commission held that the respon-
dent tippees were obligated to disclose or refrain. By trading on the
Merrill Lynch tip, the Commission found that the tippees violated
lOb-5. 31 The Commission then affirmed the hearing examiner's de-
cision to censure the defendants. 32
In his concurring opinion, Commissioner Smith warned that it
"is important in this type of case to focus on policing insiders and
what they do, which I think appropriate rather than on policing
information per se and its possession, which I think impractica-
ble.",33 In addition, Commissioner Smith voiced his opinion that
what creates the tippee's duty is the special relationship between the
insider and his source and that this relationship must be known to
the tippee in order to find him liable. Thus, said Smith, it is neces-
sary to find "the tippee knew the information was given to him in a
breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the
issuer not to disclose the information." 34
In Shapiro, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals began by noting
that the objective behind Rule lOb-5 is to protect the investing pub-
lic and to secure fair dealing within the securities market. This
would be accomplished by promoting full disclosure of inside infor-
mation, thus, preventing insider8 and tippees from taking unfair ad-
vantage of the uninformed outsiders with whom they trade.35
Citing its decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur,36 the court held that the
duty to disclose or refrain applied to all persons, whether insiders or
tippees. 37 The duty arose when the defendants were in possession of
29. Id.
30. Id. at 644.
31. Id. at 645.
32. Id. at 648.
33. Id. Commissioner Smith felt that it was important not to over generalize by
policing information per se and its possession. The result, he warned, would be the
penalization of market analysts who search for new knowledge regarding corporate de-
velopments. Id. at 649. This argument was used extensively in Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S.
Ct. 3255 (1983).
34. Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 651. Commissioner Smith's insistence that
a relationship must exist between the insider and the issuer became the basis of the
Supreme Court's argument in Chiarella, 455 U.S. 222 (1980). See infra notes 44-75 and
accompanying text.
35. Shapiro, 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974).
36. 401 F.2d at 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
37. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 238. The court rejected the tippees' contention that as
tippees they were not able to make effective public disclosure of information concerning
[Vol. 21
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss1/8
A TIPPEE'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
material nonpublic information which they knew or should have
known derived from a corporate source.3 8 The court found that all
of the defendants were obligated by this duty and that each had
breached it. The court then found that the defendants were thus
liable for civil damages39 to all persons who sold Douglas stock dur-
ing the period in which the transactions in question were made.40
After Texas Gulf, Shapiro and Investors Management, it was clear
that the lower courts had accepted the expanded standard of lOb-5
liability for insider trading.41 The standard was expanded in two
ways. First, not only were insiders liable for trading on nonpublic
information, but the recipients of this information-their tippees,
were also liable if they traded on such information. As a result,
persons who received nonpublic information from insiders should
be treated as if they were insiders. Second, the class of insiders and
tippees who became obligated by the disclose or refrain duty was
substantially expanded. The Commission in Cady appeared to re-
quire the finding of a relationship between the corporate source and
the recipient of the information before a duty arose.42 In contrast,
the courts in Shapiro and Investors Management rejected the neces-
sity of such a finding.43 Rather, all persons including insiders and
tippees, who had possession of material, nonpublic information
which emanated from a corporate source, inherited a duty to dis-
close or refrain from trading. Thus, the Cady duty was extended to
those who merely had possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion. It was this rapid expansion which inevitably resulted in the
Supreme Court's decision to redefine the duty to disclose or refrain
under Rule 10b-5. The opportunity presented itself in Chiarella v.
United States.44
a corporation with which they were not associated. The court found that the defend-
ants knew or should have known the source of the nonpublic information and that if
disclosure was not possible, they had a duty to abstain from trading. Id. at 237-38.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 241. Defendants argued that the Texas Gulf holding was inapplicable
since the remedy sought there was an injunction, whereas in Shapiro the plaintiffs
sought civil damages. The court rejected this distinction, asserting that the same public
policy reasons which existed in Texas Gulfwere present in the case at bar. Id. at 236.
Therefore, Shapiro is consistent with both Texas Gulf and Investors Management, yet, it
goes further in that it holds tippees liable for civil damages. Id. at 241.
40. Id. at 237.
41. Falls v. Fickling, 621 F.2d 1362, 1370 n.22 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Haven Indus-
tries, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437
F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 665(S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936-37 (1968).
42. Cady, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
43. Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971). See supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text.
44. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
1984]
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C. Chiarella v. United States
The Supreme Court's discontent with the Rule surfaced in 1980
when the Court heard a criminal prosecution against Vincent
Chiarella. Primarily, the Court was dissatisfied that a federal stat-
ute carrying such severe criminal and civil liability, provided little
or no indication of what type of activities gave rise to a duty to
disclose or refrain.45 As a result, the Court held that an insider's
duty to disclose or refrain does not arise merely from possession of
material, nonpublic information. Rather, the duty attaches only
when there is a pre-existing fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship
between the insider and the corporation.46
The petitioner worked in 1975 and 1976 as a markup man47 for
Pandick Press, a New York financial printer. His duties included
the handling of corporate takeover bid announcements. Although
Pandick Press took steps to conceal the names of the acquiring and
target companies on such announcements, Chiarella was able to de-
duce the true identities of many of the companies. He did so even
though his employer's policy strictly forbade such conduct. With-
out disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella began purchasing shares of
the target companies' stock and subsequently sold it immediately
after the takeover attempts were made public.4 8
Justice Powell, who delivered the majority's opinion, began by
noting that neither the statutory language of Section 10(b) nor Rule
lOb-5 provide any explicit indication whether silence49 can be re-
45. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Re-
statement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982).
46. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. This Note uses the term quasi-fiduciary to represent
those situations in which an individual has "entered into a special confidential relation-
ship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and is given access to information
solely for corporate purposes." Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983).
Such a relationship would arise where the individual is working for the corporation as
an underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant. Id.
47. As a markup man for Pandrick Press, Chiarella handled various documents
such as annual reports, proxy statements and most importantly, takeover bids.
Chiarella selected type fonts and page layouts on the documents before passing them on
to be set into type. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 455 U.S. 222
(1980).
48. Id., 445 U.S. at 224. Over a period of fourteen months, Chiarella realized a
profit of more than $30,000. However, in January 1978, he was indicted on seventeen
counts of violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id. at 224-25.
After agreeing to forfeit his profits, the petitioner was convicted a year later of a
criminal violation of both § 10b and Rule lOb-5. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F.
Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Later that year, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed Chiarella's conviction. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd, 455 U.S. 222 (1980). The court of appeals held that the duty to disclose is
imposed upon "anyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material non-
public information." Id. at 1365.
49. Silence in this sense is the failure to disclose nonpublic information. Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 226.
8
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garded as violative of the securities fraud provisions. He recognized
that because of this omission, the SEC took an important step when
it held that a broker-dealer had an affirmative duty to disclose or
refrain when his failure to do so would result in an unfair advantage
for him in the market place.50 The Court pointed out that the in-
sider's advantage derived from his relationship with the corporation
and its stockholders.5 ' The nature of this relationship is that it is
built on trust and confidence between the parties and it provides the
insider with access to material nonpublic information. Thus, the
duty to disclose or refrain will arise only when the insider has infor-
mation which the stockholders are entitled to know because of a
pre-existing relationship.5 2 Application of this duty "guarantees
that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the share-
holder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally
through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information. '5 3 In
addition, the Court recited its willingness to extend the duty beyond
insider liability.5 4 The Court recognized that tippees have been held
liable under lOb-5 since they too, "have a duty not to profit from
the use of insider information that they know is confidential."' 55
Further, the Court noted, this duty arises from the tippee's role as a
"participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty."' 56 This footnote acquired its importance three years later
when the majority in Dirks v. S.E.C. 57 cited it as authority for their
position that a tippee's duty is a derivative of the insider's
obligation.5 8
The Chiarella Court then rejected the theory employed by the
court of appeals that a duty arises solely because an individual has
50. Id. at 226-27.
51. The Court cites the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976).
Section 551(2) lists a number of relationships in which the common law imposes an
affirmative duty to disclose upon the parties to a transaction. Of note are subsections
2(a) and 2(e). 2(a) compels a party to disclose "matters known to him that the other is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them." Subsection 2(e) includes a duty when "facts basic to the transaction"
are not known to the other party and "because of the relationship between them, the
customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclo-
sure of those facts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1976).
52. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. The stockholders and the trading public are entitled
to know all material nonpublic information before the insider trades on his knowledge
of such information. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912, (1961); In re
Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 642 (1971). See supra note 21.
53. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
54. Id. at 230 n.12.
55. Id. (citing Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1974)).
56. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230, n.12.
57. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
58. Id. at 3264. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
1984]
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possession of material nonpublic information.5 9 The majority found
that both of the lower courts failed to identify a relationship be-
tween Chiarella and the selling shareholders which would impose a
duty on the petitioner. 60 As a result, the Court held that Chiarella
did not violate the fraud provisions since "he was not their [the
sellers] agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person with
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. '61
It appears that the purpose of the Court in Chiarella was to limit
the recent expansion of lOb-5 interpretation and to create a frame-
work for future litigation under the Rule.62 The holding of the
Court reflects this objective: mere possession of material, nonpublic
information does not create a duty to disclose or refrain.63 Rather,
an insider who is in possession of strategic information must have a
pre-existing fiduciary duty or other form of relationship based on
trust and confidence with the corporation and its stockholders. 64
In most pre-Chiarella cases, this requirement would have posed
little problem for the courts, since the majority of the insiders prose-
cuted were directors, officers or employees who knew secret infor-
mation. Such persons have a fiduciary duty to their employers and
thus, they fall within the Chiarella standard of liability.65 However,
there are situations such as the one in Chiarella, where individuals
who do not fall within the traditional agency definition or appear to
have no association with the corporation, nevertheless acquire se-
cret information. This problem is most apparent when tippees trade
on confidential information.
59. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-32, 235.
60. Id. at 231-32.
61. Id. at 232. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger argued essentially
that the duty to disclose or refrain is owed to the public not just to the issuer of the
information. Thus, its application is not solely dependent upon a pre-existing fiduciary
relationship with the issuer. Rather, it derives its foundation from the principle that "a
person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose
that information or refrain from trading." Id. at 240. The Chief Justice would focus on
a finding that the accused, whether corporate insider or not, used deception or some
other fraudulent scheme to obtain the information. Id. at 240-41. Thus, an investor
who purchases securities by exploiting misappropriated nonpublic information would be
liable under the Burger approach.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun joined by Justice Marshall, would have imposed a
much broader basis of liability than either the relationship test or the misappropriation
theory. Under the Blackmun standard, persons having access to material, nonpublic
information, "not legally available to others [would be prohibited from engaging] in
schemes to exploit their structural informational advantage ... " Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 25 1.
62. Id. at 234-35.
63. 445 U.S. at 235.
64. Id. at 230.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958); Langvoort, Insider Trad-
ing and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 20
n.75.
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Typically, a tippee has no fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary 66 associa-
tion with the corporate source of his information. Prior to
Chiarella, it was established that tippees could be treated as if they
were insiders if they had possession of nonpublic, material corpo-
rate information and the tippee knew or had reason to know that
the information was derived from the corporation.67 Thus, the fo-
cus was on the tippee and his wrongful trading. By disregarding the
need of finding a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship between
the tippee and his corporate source, the courts policed the posses-
sion of material, nonpublic information. Possession of such infor-
mation created an unfair advantage for a tippee who used it in the
securities markets. 68 Therefore, the courts obligated the tippee with
a duty to disclose or refrain. 69 In essence, the insider's duty passed
to the tippee when the above mentioned conditions were met.
7 0
Moreover, this duty could pass even if the tip was not a breach of
the insider's duty.7I Thus, it was evident that an insider breach was
not a necessary condition of obligating the tippee with a duty to
disclose or refrain.
Footnote 12 in Chiarella72 created a new sense of doubt over
traditional tippee liability. The Court noted that a tippees' obliga-
tion has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after
the fact in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty.73 If read literally,
the Court could have suggested that it was not only ready to narrow
the scope of insider liability under lOb-5, but also that of tippees to
situations in which the insider and his tippee worked in a co-ven-
ture.74 The Court in Chiarella, had thus set the stage for its deci-
sion in Dirks v. S.E.C..75
III. DIRKS V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The Supreme Court heard the SEC's argument against a New
York broker, Raymond Dirks, in July of 1983. The case represents
the second of two recent attempts by the Court to restrict applica-
tion of lOb-5 in regard to insider trading. In Chiarella, the circum-
66. See supra note 46.
67. Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971).
68. Id. at 644.
69. Id.
70. See, Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate Insiders in
the United States, 33 MOD. L. REv. 34, 40 (1970).
71. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 903, 912 (1961).
72. 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980).
73. Id.
74. For example, where an insider agrees to "sell" his tip to the tippee, or where
the tippee agrees to split his profits with the insider which the tippee derived from using
the tip in a stock transaction.
75. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
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stances which triggered an insider's duty to disclose or refrain were
limited to those in which a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship
existed. In Dirks, the Court seized the opportunity to address the
liability of tippees under the Rule. Relying in part on its decision in
Chiarella, the Court held that a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to
disclose or refrain only when there has been a showing that the in-
sider has breached his own duty by deriving a personal benefit from
his disclosure and where the tippee knows or should know that the
breach occurred.76
A. Facts of Dirks
In March of 1973, Raymond Dirks was an officer with Delafield
Childs, Inc.,77 a New York broker-dealer. On March 6 of 1973,
Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a former employee
of Equity Funding Corporation of America (Equity Funding).78 Se-
crist alleged that Equity Fundings' assets were greatly overstated as
the result of fraudulent practices by several of Equity Funding's
past and present employees. 79 Secrist claimed that other Equity
Funding employees had made similar accusations to various regula-
tory agencies, but to no avail. He suggested that Dirks verify the
allegations and disclose them publicly. In response, Dirks decided
to investigate by visiting Equity Funding's corporate headquarters
in Los Angeles. While there, he interviewed key officers and em-
ployees of the company as well as several of its former employees.80
76. Id. at 3264-65.
77. Delafield Childs, Inc., specialized in providing investment analysis information
of insurance company securities. 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-06 (1981).
78. Equity Funding of America was a diversified corporation, primarily in the
business of selling life insurance and mutual funds. It was the parent of Equity Funding
Life Insurance Corporation and Bankers National Life Insurance Company. Dirks, 103
S. Ct. 3255, 3258 (1983).
79. Specifically, Secrist charged that one of Equity Funding's subsidiaries had cre-
ated fictitious insurance policies and records in order to inflate the company's sales
figures to show impressive growth. In addition, Dirks was told that the company was
selling partnership interests in real estate which were nonexistent, that its top officers
had Mafia connections which it used to intimidate employees who objected to the
fabrications and finally, that Equity Funding's accounting firm, Deloite, Haskins &
Sells had dropped the Equity Funding account because of disagreement over the com-
pany's business practices. Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d 824, 829-30 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd,
103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
80. On March 20, the day after his arrival, Dirks spoke for several hours with
Patrick Hopper, a former vice president of Equity Funding who had recently retired.
Hopper admitted that he had no direct knowledge nor proof of the fraud alleged by
Secrist. However, he confirmed that he had noticed certain irregularities in the com-
pany's 1971 sales figures. Id.
Later that day Dirks spoke with Frank Majerus, a former comptroller of Equity
Funding. Majerus admitted to Dirks that he had participated in falsifications of the
company's ledgers, Id.
On March 21, Dirks spoke with members of Equity Funding's top management, each
officer firmly denied the existence of fraud at Equity Funding. Over the next two days,
12
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss1/8
1984] A TIPPEE'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
While investigating, Dirks freely communicated his evidence with
various market analysts as well as with a number of his clients
whom he knew had an interest in Equity Funding. Subsequently,
each sold most if not all of their holdings in the company.8'
The price of Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less
than $15 per share during the two weeks in which Dirks made his
investigation.8 2 On March 27, the New York Stock Exchange sus-
pended trading in Equity Funding stock and on April 2, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against Equity
Funding. The company filed a petition in bankruptcy three days
later.83
B. The Lower Courts' Decisions
The SEC took action against Dirks as well as five of his institu-
tional clients who sold Equity Funding securities. After a hearing
by an administrative law judge, the SEC held that Dirks and four of
his clients 84 had violated Rule lOb-5. Applying the Shapiro stan-
Dirks continued his investigation as he interviewed four other persons. Two of these
persons had worked as computer technicians for Equity Funding and another was still
employed at the company. All four of the men came to conclusions that Equity Fund-
ing's computer files contained fictitious insurance policies. Id.
81. On March 20, Dirks spoke with officers of the Boston Company Institutional
Investors, Inc., over the telephone. The next day, the Boston Company sold its entire
holding of Equity Funding stock and debentures for over $7 million. Dirks, 681 F.2d at
831 n.4. Dirks was explicitly told by the Boston Company that he would receive a
$25,000 commission from the Company. In re Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket
1401, 1404 (1981). Apparently, Dirks never received this. Id. at 1404 n.10. Dirks also
spoke to the Dreyfus Corporation on March 23, which sold its holdings of Equity Fund-
ing stock on March 26. Dirks, 681 F.2d at 831 n.4 (1982).
Finally, on March 26, Dirks discussed the Equity Funding scheme with representa-
tives of John W. Bristol & Co.; Tomlin, Zimmerman & Parmalee, Inc.; and Manning &
Napier. By the end of that day, all three had sold all or substantially all of their hold-
ings in Equity Funding. John W. Bristol & Co. alone, sold more than $8 million worth
of Equity Funding stock. Id.
During his investigations at Equity Funding, Dirks made two attempts to contact
outside authorities and notify them of the fraud scheme. On March 23, Dirks learned
that Equity Funding's auditors were about to release certified financial statements for
the Company. The auditors met with Dirks on the following day and he appraised
them of his findings in hope that they would withhold the release of their report. The
auditors did not heed this warning. In re Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1404
n.12.
In addition, Dirks was in contact with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's
Los Angeles bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the allegations of
fraud at Equity Funding. Blundell was skeptical about the fraud and refused to write a
story for fear of his own personal liability. Dirks, 681 F.2d at 831-32. Blundell doubted
that a fraud of such magnitude could exist without detection. He considered the evi-
dence presented by Dirks nothing more than hearsay and was afraid that publishing the
rumors on such scanty evidence might be libelous. Id.
82. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
83. Dirks, 681 F.2d at 832.
84. The Boston Institutional Investors, Inc.; John W. Bristol & Co.; Tomlin, Zim-
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dard of tippee liability,8 5 the SEC concluded that "where 'tippees'-
regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into possession
of material 'information that they know is confidential and know or
should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either pub-
licly disclose that information or refrain from trading. '86 Noting
that Dirk's investigation was pivotal in exposing the Equity Fund-
ing fraud, the SEC only censured him. 87
Dirks then sought review of the SEC decision in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 88 His defense relied upon the
holding of Chiarella. In essence, it was Dirks' assertion that he
could not be liable under Rule lOb-5 since he had no legal duty to
Equity Funding. He claimed that after Chiarella, such duty could
not be imposed without a finding of a pre-existing fiduciary duty or
other relationship. 89 In addition, Dirks claimed under Chiarella his
actions did not violate Rule lOb-5 unless his corporate sources (in-
siders) also violated the Rule. He argued that such was not the case
because California law did not compel a fiduciary to abstain from
disclosing information regarding a corporate fraud. 90 The court of
appeals rejected this argument. Chiarella, the court asserted, "fo-
cused on the existence of a set of fiduciary obligations as a prerequi-
site to the addition of a disclosure or refrain duty, but it did not
hold that breach of the fiduciary obligations was required to bring
Rule lOb-5 to bear on a case." 91 Granting to Dirks the assumption
that his corporate insiders did not breach their fiduciary duties, the
court found that under Shapiro and Investors Management, the in-
siders obligation passed to Dirks when they disseminated the infor-
mation to him. By then passing this information on to investors
who would likely trade, Dirks breached his inherited duty.92 The
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to Dirks in 1982.93
C. The Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
Justice Powell delivered the majority's opinion. After reaffirming
the Chiarella requirement that a relationship exist between an in-
merman & Parmalee, Inc.; and Manning & Napier were all censured by the SEC, In re
Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1412.
85. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38
(2d Cir. 1974).
86. In re Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (quoting
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
87. Id. at 1412.
88. Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
89. Id., 681 F.2d at 828.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 838-39. The court later reemphasized this interpretation of the Chiarella
holding. Id. at 839 n.16.
92. Id. at 837-39.
93. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
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sider and the corporation, the Court next addressed the lower court
holdings. The SEC's finding that Dirks had inherited his fiduciary
duty from Secrist was rejected by Justice Powell.94 This position,
Justice Powell asserted, differed little from the theory the Court had
rejected in Chiarella since it based liability on mere possession of
nonpublic market information. 95 The tippee does not inherit the
insider's fiduciary duty; rather, the recipient's obligation to disclose
or refrain is more properly viewed as a derivative of the insider's
duty.96 Therefore, a tippee will assume his insider's obligation not
because he has possession of nonpublic information, but rather, be-
cause he has received it from the insider "improperly. ' 97 The
Court defined "improperly" as those instances when the insider
breached the duty defined in Cady. Under these principles, the
Court articulated its standard for tippee liability under Rule lOb-5:
"a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corpora-
tion not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by dis-
closing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach."98 Having created a
standard of tippee liability which conditioned its application upon
the insider's breach, the Court then proceeded to identify the cir-
cumstances which constitute an insider breach.
The Court noted that because not all disclosures of corporate in-
formation are inconsistent with the fiduciary duty,99 it was neces-
sary to identify the element which triggered the insider's duty to
disclose or refrain. The Court concluded that whether the disclo-
sure is a breach of the Cady duty depends on the insider's purpose
in disseminating the information. Thus, since a purpose of the se-
curities laws was to eliminate "use of inside information [for] per-
94. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3262 (1983).
95. Id. Justice Powell notes that the SEC's theory appeared to be based on the
presumption that Congress had intended the anti-fraud provisions to insure equal infor-
mation among all investors in the market. The Court pointed out that this position
contradicted the Chiarella holding that mere possession of nonpublic information is not
an adequate basis for Rule lOb-5 violation. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261-62 n.16. Had the
Court accepted the SEC's theory, its standard would have been "inherently imprecise."
Thus, neither corporate insiders nor market analysts would be able to distinguish be-
tween permissible and impermissible disclosures and use of nonpublic information. Id.
at 3263 n.17.
96. Id. at 3264. The Court cited its decision in Chiarella and the fact that it viewed
the tippee's obligation as arising from his role as a "participant after the fact in the
insider's breach." Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980).
97. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
98. Id.
99. Examples of such innocent disclosures would exist when either the insider or
the tippee was unclear as to the importance (materiality) of the disclosure. In addition,
the Court would pardon corporate officials if they mistakenly thought the information
was immaterial or already public. Id. at 3265.
1984]
15
Brown: A Tippee's Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10B-5: Dirks v. S.E.C.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
sonal advantage," 100 the test was "whether the insider personally
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." 10'
Applying this standard, the Court found that since Dirks had no
pre-existing duty to Equity Funding's shareholders, his obligation
was contingent upon a finding that Secrist breached his own
duty.10 2 Neither Secrist nor the other Equity Funding employees
breached their Cady duty since they "received no monetary or per-
sonal benefit" for their disclosure. 0 3 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded, Dirks did not assume a duty. Thus, there was no violation
of Rule lOb-5.' °4
D. The Supreme Court's Minority Opinion
Noting that the majority's new standard was based on motiva-
tion, Justice Blackmun criticized the result as frustrating the pur-
pose of the SEC antifraud provisions. 0 5 He claimed that by
100. Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)). The
Commission in Cady noted that "A significant purpose of the [Securities] Exchange Act
was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside information for personal advantage was a
normal emolument of corporate office." In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
n.15 (1961).
101. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265. The Court comments that a court's determination of
an insider breach must focus on "objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id. at 3266. The SEC
expressed its fears that an insider could always "fabricate some ostensibly legitimate
business justification for transmitting the information." Id. at 3265. The Court chided
the SEC for being "unduly concerned." Id. The Court suggested that scienter is rele-
vant in some cases to determine whether an insider deceived, defrauded or manipulated
shareholders. Id. at 3265 n.23. But regardless, a court must examine objective criteria
in order to detect a breach. See supra note 100.
The Court admitted that this task will not always be easy for the courts. Dirks, 103 S.
Ct. at 3266. However, it was necessary to provide "a guiding principle" for investors,
analysts and insiders whose "daily activities must be limited and instructed by the
SEC's inside-trading rules." Id. Without such instructions, the Court felt that persons
affected by the Rule would be "forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC's litiga-
tion strategy" which the court stated would "be hazardous." Id. at 3266 n.24. Thus,
the majority felt that their new restricted standard for tippee liability would provide the
investing public with a clearer picture as to what conduct constitutes illegal insider
trading. In addition, the Court felt that their holding would limit the SEC's ability to
pick and choose the violaters it seeks to prosecute. Id. at 3266 n.24.
102. Id. at 3267.
103. Id. at 3267-68.
104. Id. at 3268. The Court noted that the court of appeals found as an additional
basis of liability that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of his position as an
employee of a broker-dealer. Dirks, 681 F.2d 824, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1982). However, the
SEC did not allege such a breach to the Supreme Court, therefore, it was not consid-
ered. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267 n.26. See Comment, Dirks v. S.E.C.: Increased Expo-
sure to Rule 10b-5 Liability for Broker-Dealers, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 853 (1983).
105. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3268 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Black-
mun noted that the majority's "innovation excuses a knowing and intentional violation
of an insider's duty to shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of personal
gain." Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the Blackmun dissent.
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss1/8
A TIPPEE'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
including private gain as an element of the insider's breach, the ma-
jority erroneously addressed the insiders' motives rather than his
actions and their consequences. 106 Citing Mosser v. Darrow, 0 7 Jus-
tice Blackmun claimed that the insider's motives are irrelevant.
Rather, the breach consisted of taking action that was disadvanta-
geous to the person to whom he owed the duty.108 The dissenting
justices would have found Secrist in violation of lOb-5 since he dis-
closed material, nonpublic information to Dirks with the intention
that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on the information. Sub-
sequently, since Secrist breached his fiduciary duty, Dirks assumed
Secrist's duty to disclose or refrain. By causing his clients to trade,
he too violated Rule lOb-5. 0 9
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court's two-part holding in Dirks is relatively narrow and
straightforward: 1) a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation to refrain from trading on material, non-
public information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee
and the tippee thereby knows or should know that the insider has
breached his duty."t0 2) A corporate insider breaches his fiduciary
duty to disclose or refrain when he discloses material, nonpublic
information to an outsider and the insider thereby derives a per-
sonal gain from such disclosure."' This standard reflects the
Court's determination, since its decision in Chiarella, to narrow the
scope of both insider and tippee liability under Rule lOb-5. Under
Chiarella, an insider was obligated to disclose or refrain only when
a pre-existing fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship had been
identified." 2 Generally, this rule was limited to actions against in-
siders since it was typically impossible to find a fiduciary type rela-
tionship between a tippee and a corporation. 1 3 Thus, most courts
106. Id. at 3271.
107. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
108. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3272 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 3274.
110. Id. at 3264.
111. Id. at 3265.
112. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
113. In order to meet the Chiarella fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship test, the
defendant must be an agent, a fiduciary or a person with whom the sellers of the stock(or the corporation) have placed their confidence and trust. Id. Tippees, in contrast,
are generally outsiders of the corporation who typically are complete strangers to the
plaintiffs. See supra note 46.
In S.E.C. v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983), a federal district court judge
ordered Lavere Gilbert Lund to disgorge profits he had acquired while trading P & F
Industries stock. Lund, who had no pre-existing relationship with P & F, was labeled a
temporary insider by the judge. Citing footnote 14 in Dirks, the judge found that'Lund
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applied the standard articulated in Investors Management, a tippee
assumed the insider's Cady duty when he knowingly received confi-
dential corporate information from the insider. This theory was re-
jected by the Dirks court in an attempt to further restrict liability
under lOb-5 for trading on nonpublic information. Dirks restricted
tippee liability in two ways: First, a tippee does not become obli-
gated by the duty to disclose or refrain unless the insider first
breached his own duty by disclosing information; second, the dis-
closure will not amount to a breach by the insider unless he gains a
personal benefit from his disclosure.' 14 This discussion will identify
two issues raised by the Dirks decision, and point out the problems
which are likely to arise as a result of the Court's holding.
A. Issues Left Unresolved
The first issue raised is whether the Dirks standard for obligating
a tippee to disclose or refrain will provide a workable framework for
litigation under Rule lOb-5. Although the Court's intention was to
restrict the application of Rule lOb-5, the means it employed may
prove to be impracticable. Justice Blackmun warned in Chiarella,
that the Court had pursued "a course, chartered in recent decisions,
designed to transform Section 10(b) from an intentionally elastic
'catchall' provision to one that catches relatively little of the misbe-
havior that all too often make investment in securities a needlessly
risky business for the uninitiated investor."'" 5 Both the Dirks mi-
nority and the SEC expressed fears as to a court's ability in many
cases to identify the existence of an insider's personal benefit. With-
out such a finding, the tippee does not inherit the insider's duty to
disclose or refrain. "16
This task may prove to be impracticable because Dirks does not
limit its classification of personal benefits merely to pecuniary ad-
vantages. Rather, the majority asserts that a finding of any direct
or indirect personal benefit is sufficient evidence of an insider
gain.' 7 Although direct benefits are easy to identify, indirect bene-
became a temporary insider of P & F because his insider source was a close friend who
did not expect Lund to use the information for a personal gain. In footnote 14, the
Dirks court recognized that under some circumstances, underwriters, accountants, law-
yers and consultants working for the corporation can acquire a fiduciary status if the
corporation expects the outsiders to keep confidential, corporate information they learn
because of their relationship with the corporation. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14
(1983). Although the term "temporary insider" has been used by scholars, it had never
been used by a court. It will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court allows this
interpretation of footnote 14, since the footnote appears to refer to a precise and narrow
category of professional relationships.
114. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264-66.
115. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980).
116. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
117. Id.
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fits are not. Direct benefits would presumably be advantages such
as a pecuniary gain. 1 8 This could be identified through discovery
procedures. In addition, the nature of direct benefits such as money
and other tangible tokens of value is that they provide the receiver
with a recognizable gain in wealth. In contrast, the court's classifi-
cation of indirect benefits is more troublesome. This category could
include such gains as reputational benefits, and the satisfaction real-
ized when the insider gives a "gift of information" to the tippee. 1 9
The majority maintains that a court should focus on objective crite-
ria and objective facts and circumstances which infer the existence
of a personal benefit.' 20 However, the nature of an indirect benefit,
as the majority uses the term, is that its identification requires one
to focus on subjective criteria. For example, a disclosure to a tippee
friend will result in an intrinsic gift-giving pleasure for the insider.
The identification of "pleasure" will certainly require a court to rely
on a subjective analysis of the insider's state of mind since the crite-
ria for such an analysis would be generosity, affection and other
emotion.12' This problem was present in Dirks itself.
It seems reasonable to conclude that by exposing the fraud
scheme of Equity Funding, Secrist gained reputational benefits in
the form of public admiration. Yet, how could a court identify the
"pleasure" Secrist received as a result of public admiration?
Clearly, it would require the court to infer that Secrist experienced
such a benefit. Unless the existence of a direct benefit can be estab-
lished, the courts will find objective criteria to be of little use in the
personal benefit analysis. As a result, the courts will be hampered
by the difficult task of identifying an indirect benefit through a sub-
jective analysis of the insider's motive.
A second issue raised by Dirks is whether the Supreme Court will
feel compelled to restrict its holding to the unique facts of Dirks. In
most fraudulent trading cases where the insider intends for his tip-
pee to trade, the insider has an improper motive. In Dirks, Secrist
clearly intended to reveal the Equity Funding fraud scheme to
Dirks in hopes that the latter would expose the hoax to the pub-
lic. 122 Yet, according to the majority, this motive was proper. The
Court saw the need to encourage exposure of fraudulent schemes.
It appears as if in order to find Secrist and Dirks not liable, the
majority designed a rule to achieve the result they deemed proper.
118. Id. at 3266.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The Supreme Court defines "gift" for income tax purposes as a transfer made
out of detached and disinterested generosity and motivated by respect, admiration,
charity or like impulses. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
122. Dirks, at 3268 (1982) (J. Blackmun dissenting).
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This tailored standard may prove to be impractical for application
to other factual situations. 123 If this is the result, the Court's initial
objective to retrench the application of lOb-5 in regard to tippee
trading, will remain unaccomplished.
B. An Alternative Solution to the Dirks Holding
Essentially, the Dirks holding restricted the application of lOb-5
in regard to tippee liability in two ways. First, a tippee assumes the
Cady duty only when the insider has breached his duty. Second,
the insider breaches his duty only when he has derived a benefit
from his disclosure. The entire Supreme Court appears to favor the
first element of the Dirks holding which was originally expressed by
Commissioner Smith in Investors Management.124 This rule follows
consistently with the Chiarella mandate that the Cady duty to dis-
close or refrain does not arise merely from the possession of insider
information. 125 The second element is novel and as such, has little,
if any, support from case law on the subject. 126 As mentioned
above, this element creates several practical problems for the courts
and it is the focus of the dissent's blistering attack on the majority
opinion. 127 Therefore, the alternative solution presented by this
Note would discard this element from the tippee duty to disclose or
refrain.
This alternative solution would obligate a tippee with the Cady
123. For example, had Secrist been motivated purely by a desire to injure the man-
agement at Equity Funding, application of the Dirks rule would result in an absurd
outcome. In this hypothetical, Secrist would have an improper motive, but he neverthe-
less failed to derive a benefit and thus, would not have breached his duty.
The Court's holding seems to reflect the dilemma posed by the unique facts of this
case. Equity Funding shareholders were clearly hurt by the conduct of Dirks. In addi-
tion, his clients saved millions of dollars, yet they suffered only an administrative slap
on the wrist. In re Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1412-13 (1981). See
supra note 84. However, Dirks did play an important role in bringing Equity Funding's
fraud scheme to a halt, and as the SEC observed, he reported the fraud allegation to the
Company's auditors and sought to have the information published in the Wall Street
Journal. Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1404. Apparently, the majority con-
cluded that the benefit to society from exposure of such fraud schemes. qutweighs the
harm caused to corporate shareholders. The dissent found this policy , gument to be
an improper justification for the Court's holding. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3272-73
(1983).
124. 44 S.E.C. 633, 650 (1971). See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
125. Under this rule, a tippee can be obligated by the Cady duty only where his
insider source has made the information available to the tippee improperly. Dirks, 103
S. Ct. at 3264. However, what constitutes an improper disclosure requires an examina-
tion of the second element in the Dirks holding: the necessity of finding that the insider
gained a benefit. Id. at 3265.
126. As the minority recognizes, the only support cited by the majority is a reference
to Cady and a law review article by Professor Brudney. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advan-
tages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 345-48 (1979).
127. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3268 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss1/8
A TIPPEE'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
duty to disclose or refrain when the tippee knows or has reason to
know that material, nonpublic information has become available to
him as the result of a breach of duty by the insider. The insider
owes his duty to the corporation not to use or disclose the informa-
tion for non-corporate purposes. One way an insider would breach
this duty, is by disclosing the information to a tippee whom he
knew would trade or was likely to trade on the basis of that infor-
mation. Essentially, this solution is a hybrid of the standards used
in Investors Management and Dirks.1
28
The advantage of this alternative is twofold. First, it retains the
initial element of the Dirks holding, namely, that the tippee is
viewed as a participant after the fact of the insider's breach. Unless
the insider breaches his duty, the tippee is not obligated to disclose
or refrain. As a result, the application of Rule lOb-5 is restricted to
an extent, but not to the extreme which results from the Dirks hold-
ing. 129 Second, the alternative solution focuses the insider's duty on
the conduct Congress sought to prevent, specifically, the fraudulent
and manipulative use of nonpublic information to the detriment of
the investing public.130 Under the Dirks' rule, the insider's conduct
is forbidden only when the insider gains a benefit from his disclo-
sure. This premise ignores the fact that shareholders are injured
regardless of whether the insider derives a benefit from his disclo-
sure. Their injury transpires whenever the insider or his tippee
trade on nonpublic corporate information, which if known to the
shareholder, would have affected his decision to trade.131 Certainly,
a primary purpose of Rule lOb-5 is to prevent unjust enrichment of
the insider. However, this is only one of the results the duty seeks
to prevent. 132 This alternative solution ignores the personal benefit
analysis and instead focuses on the conduct which is likely to lead
to shareholder injury. 133
Secrist clearly knew that Dirks would exploit the information
128. Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); In re Investors Management Co., Inc.,
44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). See infra note 133.
129. Th alternative solution would not restrict application of Rule lOb-5 to the
extent that\neDirks holding did since the second element of Dirks is discarded-the
requirement that the insider gain a personal benefit.
130. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
131. Indeed, this is the nature of material, nonpublic information. See supra note
21. It seems obvious that the shareholders who purchased the Equity Funding stock
from Dirks' clients, would not have acquired the stock had they known of the fraud
scheme. Yet, the fact that Secrist was not paid a cash bonus in consideration for his tip
did not reduce the extent of the stockholder's injury.
132. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3271 n.9 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. This alternative solution is not profound nor startling. It is in essence, an in-
corporation of first element of the Dirks holding with the standard for tippee liability as
laid down by Investors Management. See supra note 20-32 and accompanying text. It
merely restricts the application of the duty to disclose or refrain in regard to tippee
trading, to those situations in which the insider has breached his own duty and the
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that he had been tipped. Thus, under the alternative solution, Se-
crist would have breached his duty by tipping Dirks. Consequently,
Dirks would have been obligated by the duty to disclose or refrain.
Since Dirks did not publicly disclose the information before causing
his clients to trade, he too breached his duty. 134
CONCLUSION
Ever since the SEC heard the case of Cady, Roberts & Co., the
doctrine which it then expressed, the disclose or refrain rule, has
been redefined and reinterpretated repeatedly. This effort reflects
the inherently ambiguous nature of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5, to
which the Cady doctrine applied. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
were drafted in such a manner that judicial interpretation was es-
sential. Because of this, the courts eventually expanded the rule to
cover a variety of fraudulent activities in the securities market.
Attempting to define the scope of tippee liability, the courts in
Investors Management and Shapiro exercised this role of expanding
the scope of Rule lOb-5 liability. Their decisions reflected a belief
that breaches by tippees were equally as scandalous as those of cor-
porate insiders. A fundamental problem surfaced, however, when
the Supreme Court in Chiarella, held that the duty to disclose or
refrain arises only when an insider has a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary
relationship with the corporation from which the information de-
rived. Thus, mere possession of inside information did not obligate
a party to disclose or refrain. 135 However, the courts experienced
difficulty in applying the Chiarella rule to tippees, since they typi-
cally were not fiduciaries or quasi-fiduciaries of the corporation. If
the Chiarella rule were applied, most tippees would not become ob-
ligated by the Cady disclose or refrain duty. The Supreme Court, in
Dirks attempted to rectify this inconsistency.
In Dirks, the Court restricted application of the Cady duty in
regard to tippee trading to those instances when the insider
breached his own fiduciary duty by deriving a personal gain from
his disclosure. A tippee became obligated by a duty to disclose or
refrain only when the insider breached his duty by acquiring a di-
tippee knows of the breach. Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3264 (1983); In re Inves-
tors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971).
134. The fact that this result is contradictory to the Court's apparent desire tofind
Secrist and Dirks not liable, manifests the problem mentioned above in supra notes 118-
19 and accompanying text. The Dirks court seems to have designed a rule to fit the
unique facts of the case. Under previous case law, Dirks and Secrist would have cer-
tainly violated Rule 10b-5. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd,
103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
135. 445 U.S. 222, 232-35 (1980).
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rect or indirect personal benefit. By adding the personal gain ele-
ment to the insider's breach, the Court thereby substantially
constricted tippee liability under Rule lOb-5. As this Note reveals,
the Court has created a standard which may prove to be impractica-
ble, thereby limiting its application to only those factual situations
similar to Dirks.
As an alternative to the Dirks holding, this Note has suggested a
standard which would avoid the pitfalls of the Dirks rule and yet,
would still meet the Court's objective, to narrow the application of
Rule lOb-5. By discarding the necessity of finding a personal bene-
fit in the insider's breach, the alternative focuses on the insider's
conduct and forbids those acts which would lead to shareholder
injury.
This solution is essentially a compromise between the Dirks hold-
ing and the standard applied by the courts prior to this intriguing
case. It represents a step, rather than a leap, towards restricting the
application of Rule lOb-5 to tippee trading. Regardless whether the
Court adopts a similar rule in the future, it seems certain that the
Supreme Court will find it necessary to articulate a new standard
which will narrow the scope of tippee liability, yet which will be
sufficiently broad to "catch" the fraud Congress intended Section
10b to embrace.
Scott Chase Brown
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